“The Congress makes the following findings:“(1) In the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of Public Law 103–447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress declared that ‘full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date …’.
“(2) In the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (title VI of section 101(c) of title I of division A of Public Law 104–208; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress called for the prompt admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia to NATO, and declared that ‘in order to promote economic stability and security in Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine . . . the process of enlarging NATO to include emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should not be limited to consideration of admitting Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia as full members of the NATO Alliance’.
“(3) In the European Security Act of 1998 (title XXVII of division G of Public Law 105–277; 22 U.S.C. 1928 note), Congress declared that ‘Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic should not be the last emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe invited to join NATO’ and that ‘Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria . . . would make an outstanding contribution to furthering the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe should they become NATO members [and] upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest possible date’.
“(4) At the Madrid Summit of the NATO Alliance in July 1997, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join the Alliance in the first round of NATO enlargement, and the NATO heads of state and government issued a declaration stating ‘[t]he Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership . . . [n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the [North Atlantic] Treaty will be excluded from consideration’.
“(5) At the Washington Summit of the NATO Alliance in April 1999, the NATO heads of state and government issued a communique declaring ‘[w]e pledge that NATO will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the [North Atlantic] Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area . . . [t]he three new members will not be the last . . . [n]o European democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration, regardless of its geographic location …’.
“(6) In late 2002, NATO will hold a summit in Prague, the Czech Republic, at which it will decide which additional emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to invite to join the Alliance in the next round of NATO enlargement.
“(7) In May 2000 in Vilnius, Lithuania, the foreign ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia issued a statement (later joined by Croatia) declaring that their countries will cooperate in jointly seeking NATO membership in the next round of NATO enlargement, that the realization of NATO membership by one or more of these countries would be a success for all, and that eventual NATO membership for all of these countries would be a success for Europe and NATO.
“(8) On June 15, 2001, in a speech in Warsaw, Poland, President George W. Bush stated ‘[a]ll of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom—and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe—as Europe’s old democracies have . . . I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings . . . [a]s we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a pawn in the agenda of others . . . [w]e will not trade away the fate of free European peoples . . . [n]o more Munichs . . . [n]o more Yaltas . . . [a]s we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom’.
“(9) On October 22, 1996, in a speech in Detroit, Michigan, former President William J. Clinton stated ‘NATO’s doors will not close behind its first new members . . . NATO should remain open to all of Europe’s emerging democracies who are ready to shoulder the responsibilities of membership . . . [n]o nation will be automatically excluded . . . [n]o country outside NATO will have a veto . . . [a] gray zone of insecurity must not reemerge in Europe’.