“It is the policy of the United States—“(1) to continue to actively participate in the trilateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cybersecurity and protection of critical infrastructure conducted among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;
“(2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners and allies to deepen energy security cooperation among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and to encourage the private sector to make investments in energy infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean region;
“(3) to strongly support the completion of the Trans Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines and the establishment of liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals across the Eastern Mediterranean as a means of diversifying regional energy needs away from the Russian Federation;
“(4) to maintain a robust United States naval presence and investments in the naval facility at Souda Bay, Greece and develop deeper security cooperation with Greece to include the recent MQ–9 deployments to the Larissa Air Force Base and United States Army helicopter training in central Greece;
“(5) to welcome Greece’s commitment to move forward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the Balkans and central Europe;
“(6) to support deepened security cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus through the removal of the arms embargo on the country;
“(7) to support robust International Military Education and Training (IMET) programming with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus;
“(8) to leverage relationships within the European Union to encourage investments in Cypriot border and maritime security;
“(9) to support efforts to counter Russian Federation interference and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean through increased security cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, to include intelligence sharing, cyber, and maritime domain awareness;
“(10) to support the Republic of Cyprus’ efforts to regulate its banking industry to ensure that it is not used as a source of international money laundering and encourage additional measures toward that end;
“(11) to strongly oppose any actions that would trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115–44) [22 U.S.C. 9525], to include the purchase of military equipment from the Russian Federation;
“(12) to continue robust official strategic engagement with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;
“(13) to urge countries in the region to deny port services to Russian Federation vessels deployed to support the government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria;
“(14) to support joint military exercises among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;
“(15) to fully implement relevant CAATSA provisions to prevent interference by the Russian Federation in the region;
“(16) to support efforts by countries in the region to demobilize military equipment supplied by the Russian Federation in favor of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-allied member countries; and
“(17) to strongly support the active and robust participation of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.
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