“It is the sense of Congress that—“(1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan is characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-led faction of the Government of Sudan;
“(2) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have continued to violate the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, and violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and personnel of AMIS is increasing;
“(3) the African Union should immediately make all necessary preparations for an orderly transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which will maintain an appropriate level of African participation, with a mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and deter violence in the Darfur region;
“(4) the international community, including the United States and the European Union, should immediately act to mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial resources through the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to support the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation with the size, strength, and capacity necessary to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and to end the continued violence in the Darfur region;
“(5) if an expanded and reinforced AMIS or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation fails to stop genocide in the Darfur region, the international community should take additional measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in the Darfur region;
“(6) acting under article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for suspension of the Government of Sudan’s rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region;
“(7) the President should use all necessary and appropriate diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the responsibilities of the Committee of the United Nations Security Council and the panel of experts established pursuant to section 3(a) of Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005);
“(8) the President should direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that—“(A) extends the military embargo established by United Nations Security Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005) to include a total ban on the sale or supply of offensive military equipment to the Government of Sudan, except for use in an internationally recognized demobilization program or for nonlethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan or the Darfur Peace Agreement; and
“(B) calls upon those member states of the United Nations that continue to undermine efforts to foster peace in Sudan by providing military assistance to the Government of Sudan, government supported militias, or any rebel group operating in Darfur in violation of the embargo on such assistance and equipment, as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005), to immediately cease and desist.
“(9) the United States should not provide assistance to the Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement, the support of the regional Government of Southern Sudan, the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, and marginalized areas in Northern Sudan (including the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja), Darfur, and Nubia), or for humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
“(10) the President should seek to assist members of the Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a student loan forgiveness program for those individuals who commit to return to Southern Sudan for a period of not less than 5 years for the purpose of contributing professional skills needed for the reconstruction of Southern Sudan;
“(11) the Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan should be provided with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to—“(A) provide stewardship of efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement;
“(B) seek ways to bring stability and peace to the Darfur region;
“(C) address instability elsewhere in Sudan, Chad, and northern Uganda; and
“(D) pursue a truly comprehensive peace throughout the region;
“(12) the international community should strongly condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and African Union personnel, and the forcible recruitment of refugees and internally displaced persons from camps in Chad and Sudan, and demand that all armed groups in the region, including the forces of the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, the Justice and Equality Movement, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), and all other armed groups refrain from such activities;
“(13) the United States should fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement and urge rapid implementation of their terms;
“(14) the May 5, 2006[,] signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement was a positive development in a situation that has seen little political progress in 2 years and should be seized upon by all sides to begin the arduous process of post-conflict reconstruction, restitution, justice, and reconciliation; and
“(15) the new leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (referred to in this paragraph as ‘SPLM’) should—“(A) seek to transform SPLM into an inclusive, transparent, and democratic body;
“(B) reaffirm the commitment of SPLM to—“(i) bring peace to Southern Sudan, the Darfur region, and Eastern Sudan; and
“(ii) eliminate safe haven for regional rebel movements, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army; and
“(C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine SPLM.