The Congress finds the following:(1) In 1980, the United States opened trade relations with the People’s Republic of China by entering into a bilateral trade agreement, which was approved by joint resolution enacted pursuant to section 2435(c) of title 19.
(2) Since 1980, the President has consistently extended nondiscriminatory treatment to products of the People’s Republic of China, pursuant to his authority under section 2434 of title 19.
(3) Since 1980, the United States has entered into several additional trade-related agreements with the People’s Republic of China, including a memorandum of understanding on market access in 1992, two agreements on intellectual property rights protection in 1992 and 1995, and an agreement on agricultural cooperation in 1999.
(4) Trade in goods between the People’s Republic of China and the United States totaled almost $95,000,000,000 in 1999, compared with approximately $18,000,000,000 in 1989, representing growth of approximately 428 percent over 10 years.
(5) The United States merchandise trade deficit with the People’s Republic of China has grown from approximately $6,000,000,000 in 1989 to over $68,000,000,000 in 1999, a growth of over 1,000 percent.
(6) The People’s Republic of China currently restricts imports through relatively high tariffs and nontariff barriers, including import licensing, technology transfer, and local content requirements.
(7) United States businesses attempting to sell goods to markets in the People’s Republic of China have complained of uneven application of tariffs, customs procedures, and other laws, rules, and administrative measures affecting their ability to sell their products in the Chinese market.
(8) On November 15, 1999, the United States and the People’s Republic of China concluded a bilateral agreement concerning terms of the People’s Republic of China’s eventual accession to the World Trade Organization.
(9) The commitments that the People’s Republic of China made in its November 15, 1999, agreement with the United States promise to eliminate or greatly reduce the principal barriers to trade with and investment in the People’s Republic of China, if those commitments are effectively complied with and enforced.
(10) The record of the People’s Republic of China in implementing trade-related commitments has been mixed. While the People’s Republic of China has generally met the requirements of the 1992 market access memorandum of understanding and the 1992 and 1995 agreements on intellectual property rights protection, other measures remain in place or have been put into place which tend to diminish the benefit to United States businesses, farmers, and workers from the People’s Republic of China’s implementation of those earlier commitments. Notably, administration of tariff-rate quotas and other trade-related laws remains opaque, new local content requirements have proliferated, restrictions on importation of animal and plant products are not always supported by sound science, and licensing requirements for importation and distribution of goods remain common. Finally, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has failed to cooperate with the United States Customs Service in implementing a 1992 memorandum of understanding prohibiting trade in products made by prison labor.
(11) The human rights record of the People’s Republic of China is a matter of very serious concern to the Congress. The Congress notes that the Department of State’s 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the People’s Republic of China finds that “[t]he Government’s poor human rights record deteriorated markedly throughout the year, as the Government intensified efforts to suppress dissent, particularly organized dissent.”.
(12) The Congress deplores violations by the Government of the People’s Republic of China of human rights, religious freedoms, and worker rights that are referred to in the Department of State’s 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for the People’s Republic of China, including the banning of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, denial in many cases, particularly politically sensitive ones, of effective representation by counsel and public trials, extrajudicial killings and torture, forced abortion and sterilization, restriction of access to Tibet and Xinjiang, perpetuation of “reeducation through labor”, denial of the right of workers to organize labor unions or bargain collectively with their employers, and failure to implement a 1992 memorandum of understanding prohibiting trade in products made by prison labor.
(Pub. L. 106–286, div. B, title II, § 202, Oct. 10, 2000, 114 Stat. 892.)
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
Short Title of 2024 AmendmentPub. L. 118–70, § 1, July 12, 2024, 138 Stat. 1487, provided that: “This Act [enacting and amending provisions set out as notes under this section] may be cited as the ‘Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act’.”
Short Title of 2020 AmendmentPub. L. 116–145, § 1(a), June 17, 2020, 134 Stat. 648, provided that: “This Act [enacting provisions set out as a note under this section] may be cited as the ‘Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020’.”
Short Title of 2003 AmendmentPub. L. 108–7, div. P, § 1, Feb. 20, 2003, 117 Stat. 552, provided that: “This division [amending section 7002 of this title and enacting provisions set out as notes under section 7002 of this title] may be cited as the ‘United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission’.”
Short TitlePub. L. 106–286, div. B, title II, § 201(a), Oct. 10, 2000, 114 Stat. 891, provided that: “This division [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000’.”
Transfer of Functions
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 203(1), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6. For establishment of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security, treated as if included in Pub. L. 107–296 as of Nov. 25, 2002, see section 211 of Title 6, as amended generally by Pub. L. 114–125, and section 802(b) of Pub. L. 114–125, set out as a note under section 211 of Title 6.
Countering PRC Influence Fund UnitPub. L. 119–60, div. E, title I, § 5148, Dec. 18, 2025, 139 Stat. 1576, provided that:
“(a) Establishment.—The Secretary [of State] shall establish and maintain a Countering the PRC Influence Fund Unit (in this section referred to as the ‘CPIF Unit’) in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
“(b) Personnel.—“(1) Composition.—The CPIF Unit may be comprised of a Director, Deputy Director, and additional staff as appropriate, including a Budget Analyst, a Grant Officer, a Program Assistant, and a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Specialist.
“(2) Staffing.—The CPIF Unit shall be comprised of personnel with expertise or experience in performing the following functions:“(A) Grants Officer.
“(B) Program Assistant.
“(C) Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Specialist.
“(3) Director.—The Director of the CPIF Unit shall fulfill the following responsibilities:“(A) Identify on an annual basis specific strategic priorities for the CPIF Unit consistent with United States national security priorities and objectives.
“(B) In coordination with the head of the Office of Foreign Assistance and other relevant officials of the Department [of State], coordinate, select, and approve all CPIF Unit programming, such as geographic and functional areas of focus, based on criteria that the program directly counters malign activities by the People’s Republic of China.
“(C) Ensure that all CPIF Unit programming advances United States foreign policy and national security interests.
“(D) Conduct oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all CPIF Unit programming to ensure that it advances United States foreign policy and national security interests and degrades the ability of the People’s Republic of China or entities acting on the behalf of the People’s Republic of China to conduct malign influence operations.
“(E) Ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that all CPIF Unit programming is carried out in coordination with other Federal activities to counter PRC malign influence.
“(F) On a quarterly basis, brief the appropriate congressional committees [Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives] on the development of annual strategic priorities and CPIF Unit project selection and implementation.
“(G) Provide a written list of CPIF Unit projects approved for each fiscal year to—“(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
“(ii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
“(4) Deputy director.—The Deputy Director of the CPIF Unit may have responsibility for policy and programming to assist the Director, particularly with respect to CPIF Unit activities handled by other United States departments and agencies.
“(c) Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Activities.—The Director of the CPIF Unit may—“(1) direct monitoring, evaluation, and learning activities to assess programmatic outcomes, maximize government efficiency, and reduce the risks of fraud and waste;
“(2) conduct regular research and evaluation of CPIF Unit programs and activities to improve ongoing and future activities, including by implementing a process to ensure monitoring, evaluation, and learning results are considered in funding decisions; and
“(3) make available to the appropriate congressional committees the findings of any research or evaluation conducted under paragraph (2).
“(d) PRC Malign Influence Defined.—In this section, the term ‘PRC malign influence’ means activities by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or an entity acting on the behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China that—“(1) undermines a free and open international order;
“(2) utilizes covert or overt information operations, corruption, political interference, cultural pressure, or economic coercion and dependency to influence the political, military, economic, or other policies of a foreign country to advance the strategic objectives of the People’s Republic of China;
“(3) undermines the national security, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or other country; or
“(4) undermines the political and economic security of the United States or other country, including by facilitating corruption or elite capture, distorting markets, and advancing coercive economic practices, including theft of intellectual property, and engaging in foreign information operations.
“(e) Termination.—The CPIF Unit established under this section shall terminate on the date that is four years after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 18, 2025].”
Ending China’s Developing Nation StatusPub. L. 118–31, div. E, title LIV, § 5413, Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 951, provided that:
“(a) Finding; Statement of Policy.—“(1) Finding.—Congress finds that the People’s Republic of China is still classified as a developing nation under multiple treaties and international organization structures, even though China has grown to be the second largest economy in the world.
“(2) Statement of policy.—It is the policy of the United States—“(A) to oppose the labeling or treatment of the People’s Republic of China as a developing nation in current and future treaty negotiations and in each international organization of which the United States and the People’s Republic of China are both current members;
“(B) to pursue the labeling or treatment of the People’s Republic of China as a developed nation in each international organization of which the United States and the People’s Republic of China are both current members; and
“(C) to work with allies and partners of the United States to implement the policies described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
“(b) Definitions.—In this section:“(1) The term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ means—“(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives with respect to subsection (c); and
“(B) the Committee on Finance of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives with respect to subsection (d).
“(2) The term ‘OECD’ means the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
“(3) The term ‘Secretary’ means the Secretary of State.
“(4) The term ‘WTO’ means the World Trade Organization.
“(c) Duties of the Secretary.—“(1) Report on development status in current treaty negotiations.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 22, 2023], the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that—“(A) identifies all current treaty negotiations in which—“(i) the proposed treaty would provide for different treatment or standards for enforcement of the treaty based on respective development status of the states that are party to the treaty; and
“(ii) the People’s Republic of China is actively participating in the negotiations, or it is reasonably foreseeable that the People’s Republic of China would seek to become a party to the treaty; and
“(B) for each treaty negotiation identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), describes how the treaty under negotiation would provide different treatment or standards for enforcement of the treaty based on development status of the states parties.
“(2) Report on development status in existing organizations and treaties.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that—“(A) identifies all international organizations or treaties of which the United States is a member, that provide different treatment or standards for enforcement based on the respective development status of the member states or states parties;
“(B) describes the mechanisms for changing the country designation for each relevant treaty or organization; and
“(C) for each of the organizations or treaties identified pursuant to subparagraph (A)—“(i) includes a list of countries that— “(I) are labeled as developing nations or receive the benefits of a developing nation under the terms of the organization or treaty; and
“(II) meet the World Bank classification for upper middle income or high-income countries; and
“(ii) describes how the organization or treaty provides different treatment or standards for enforcement based on development status of the member states or states parties.
“(3) Mechanisms for changing development status.—“(A) In general.—In any international organization of which the United States and the People’s Republic of China are both current members, the Secretary, in consultation with allies and partners of the United States, shall pursue—“(i) changing the status of the People’s Republic of China from developing nation to developed nation if a mechanism exists in such organization to make such status change; or
“(ii) the development of a mechanism described in clause (i) to change the status of the People’s Republic of China in such organization from developing nation to developed nation.
“(B) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to any international organization if the President notifies the appropriate committees of Congress that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States.
“(4) Exception.—This subsection shall not apply to the WTO or any treaty identified in subsection (d).
“(d) Duties of the United States Trade Representative.—“(1) Report on special and differential treatment at the world trade organization.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 22, 2023], the United States Trade Representative shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that—“(A) identifies each provision of a WTO agreement that provides for special and differential treatment based on the self-declared development status of WTO members, including the People’s Republic of China;
“(B) identifies—“(i) all current multilateral negotiations at the WTO in which proposed negotiating text would provide for special and differential treatment for WTO members; and
“(ii) all current plurilateral negotiations at the WTO in which the People’s Republic of China is actively participating, or it is reasonably foreseeable that the People’s Republic of China would seek to become a party to the agreement, in which proposed negotiating text would provide for special and differential treatment for WTO members;
“(C) for each negotiation identified pursuant to subparagraph (B), describes how the draft provisions as of the date of the report would provide different treatment or standards for enforcement based on the self-declared development status of WTO members;
“(D) includes a list of WTO members that—“(i) self-declare as developing country WTO members;
“(ii) meet the World Bank classification for upper middle-income or high-income countries; and
“(iii)(I) are members of, or applicants to, the OECD; or
“(II) account for not less than 0.5 percent of global merchandise trade annually for each of the most recently completed 5 calendar years; and
“(E) describes how the WTO provides different treatment or standards for enforcement based on the self-declared development status of the WTO members.
“(2) Sense of congress on mechanisms for changing special and differential treatment at the world trade organization.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with allies and partners of the United States, should—“(A) oppose the use of special and differential treatment by the People’s Republic of China at the WTO;
“(B) work to preclude the People’s Republic of China from being eligible to use special and differential treatment in future WTO agreements; and
“(C) work to set appropriate thresholds, based on objective criteria, for determining each country’s eligibility for special and differential treatment in current and future WTO negotiations, consistent with subparagraphs (A) and (B).”
Prohibition on Importation of Goods Made Through Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous RegionPub. L. 117–78, Dec. 23, 2021, 135 Stat. 1525, provided that:
[For delegation of functions of the President under section 5(c) of Pub. L. 117–78, set out above, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Dec. 7, 2023, 88 F.R. 87651, set out below.]
Imposition of SanctionsPub. L. 116–145, § 6, June 17, 2020, 134 Stat. 651, as amended by Pub. L. 117–78, § 5(a), Dec. 23, 2021, 135 Stat. 1531; Pub. L. 118–159, div. G, title LXXVIII, § 7812(h), Dec. 23, 2024, 138 Stat. 2566, provided that:
“(a) Report Required.—“(1) In general.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [June 17, 2020], and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that identifies each foreign person, including any official of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, that the President determines is responsible for any of the following with respect to Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, members of other Muslim minority groups, or other persons in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:“(A) Torture.
“(B) Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
“(C) Prolonged detention without charges and trial.
“(D) Causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons.
“(E) Other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.
“(F) Serious human rights abuses in connection with forced labor.
“(2) Form.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
“(b) Imposition of Sanctions.—The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1).
“(c) Sanctions Described.—The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:“(1) Asset blocking.—The President shall exercise all of the powers granted to the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of a foreign person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) if such property and interests in property—“(A) are in the United States;
“(B) come within the United States; or
“(C) come within the possession or control of a United States person.
“(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.—“(A) Visas, admission, or parole.—An alien described in subsection (a)(1) is—“(i) inadmissible to the United States;
“(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
“(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
“(B) Current visas revoked.—“(i) In general.—An alien described in subsection (a)(1) is subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.
“(ii) Immediate effect.—A revocation under clause (i) shall— “(I) take effect immediately; and
“(II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.
“(3) Penalties.—The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206.
“(d) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
“(e) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person identified in the report required under subsection (a)(1) if the President determines and certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States.
“(f) Exceptions.—“(1) Exception for intelligence activities.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
“(2) Exception to comply with international obligations and for law enforcement activities.—Sanctions under subsection (c)(2) shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary—“(A) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations; or
“(B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States.
“(3) Exception relating to importation of goods.—“(A) In general.—The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
“(B) Good defined.—In this paragraph, the term ‘good’ means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.
“(g) Termination of Sanctions.—The President may terminate the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a person if the President determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives not later than 15 days before the termination takes effect that—“(1) information exists that the person did not engage in the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
“(2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the activity for which sanctions were imposed;
“(3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for the activity for which sanctions were imposed, and has credibly committed to not engage in an activity described in subsection (a)(1) in the future; or
“(4) the termination of the sanctions is in the national security interests of the United States.
“(h) Sunset.—This section, and any sanctions imposed under this section, shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act [June 17, 2020].
“(i) Definitions.—In this section:“(1) Admission; admitted; alien.—The terms ‘admission’, ‘admitted’, and ‘alien’ have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
“(2) Foreign person.—The term ‘foreign person’ means a person that is not a United States person.
“(3) United states person.—The term ‘United States person’ means—“(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
“(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.”
[For delegation of functions of the President under section 6 of Pub. L. 116–145, set out above, see Memorandum of President of the United States, Dec. 7, 2023, 88 F.R. 87651, set out below.]
Monitoring of Implementation of 1979 Agreement Between the United States and China on Cooperation in Science and TechnologyPub. L. 107–314, div. A, title XII, § 1207, Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2666, as amended by Pub. L. 114–323, title VII, § 715(b)(4), Dec. 16, 2016, 130 Stat. 1946, provided that:
“(a) In General.—The Secretary of State shall—“(1) monitor the implementation of the Agreement specified in subsection (c);
“(2) keep a systematic account of the protocols to the Agreement;
“(3) coordinate the activities of all agencies of the United States Government that carry out cooperative activities under the Agreement; and
“(4) ensure that all activities conducted under the Agreement comply with applicable laws and regulations concerning the transfer of militarily sensitive technologies and dual-use technologies.
“(b) Responsibilities of the Office of Science and Technology Cooperation.—Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary of State, the functions of the Secretary under this section shall be carried out through the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Cooperation of the Department of State.
“(c) Agreement Defined.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘Agreement’ means the agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China known as the ‘Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in Science and Technology’, signed in Washington on January 31, 1979, and its protocols.
“(d) Interagency Working Group.—The President shall establish an interagency working group to oversee the implementation of the Agreement by departments and agencies of the United States. The working group shall consist of representatives of such departments, agencies, and offices of the executive branch as the President considers appropriate. The working group shall perform the following functions:“(1) Assisting the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials in setting standards under the Agreement for science and technology transfers between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.
“(2) Monitoring ongoing programs and activities under the Agreement and recommending future programs and activities under the Agreement.
“(3) Developing a comprehensive database of all government-to-government programs and United States Government-funded programs under the Agreement.
“(4) Coordinating activities under the Agreement between United States Government agencies, including elements of the intelligence community, as appropriate.”
[Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director’s capacity as the head of the intelligence community deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence. Reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Director’s capacity as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency deemed to be a reference to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. See section 1081(a), (b) of Pub. L. 108–458, set out as a note under section 3001 of Title 50, War and National Defense.]
Tibetan PolicyPub. L. 118–70, § 3, July 12, 2024, 138 Stat. 1488, provided that:
“It is the policy of the United States—
“(1) that the Tibetan people are a people with a distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identity;
“(2) that the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China must be resolved in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter, by peaceful means, through dialogue without preconditions;
“(3) that the People’s Republic of China should cease its propagation of disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama;
“(4) to encourage the People’s Republic of China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and uphold all its commitments under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and
“(5) in accordance with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 [Pub. L. 116–260, div. FF, title III, subtitle E (§§ 341–346), see Tables for classification]—“(A) to promote substantive dialogue without pre-conditions, between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama, his or her representatives, or democratically elected leaders of the Tibetan community, or explore activities to improve prospects for dialogue, that leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet;
“(B) to coordinate with other governments in multilateral efforts towards the goal of a negotiated agreement on Tibet; and
“(C) to encourage the Government of the People’s Republic of China to address the aspirations of the Tibetan people with regard to their distinct historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity.”
Pub. L. 116–260, div. FF, title III, § 342, Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 3122, provided that:
“(a) Findings.—Congress finds the following:“(1) Tibetan Buddhism is practiced in many countries including Bhutan, India, Mongolia, Nepal, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the United States, yet the Government of the People’s Republic of China has repeatedly insisted on its role in managing the selection of Tibet’s next spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, through actions such as those described in the ‘Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas’ in 2007.
“(2) On March 19, 2019, Chinese Ministry of Affairs spokesperson reiterated that the ‘reincarnation of living Buddhas including the Dalai Lama must comply with Chinese laws and regulations and follow religious rituals and historical conventions’.
“(3) The Government of the People’s Republic of China has interfered in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including in 1995 by arbitrarily detaining Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, a 6-year old boy who was identified as the 11th Panchen Lama, and purporting to install its own candidate as the Panchen Lama.
“(4) The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, issued a statement on September 24, 2011, explaining the traditions and spiritual precepts of the selection of Dalai Lamas, setting forth his views on the considerations and process for selecting his successor, and providing a response to the Chinese government’s claims that only the Chinese government has the ultimate authority in the selection process of the Dalai Lama.
“(5) The 14th Dalai Lama said in his statement that the person who reincarnates has sole legitimate authority over where and how he or she takes rebirth and how that reincarnation is to be recognized and if there is a need for a 15th Dalai Lama to be recognized, then the responsibility shall primarily rest with the officers of the Dalai Lama’s Gaden Phodrang Trust, who will be informed by the written instructions of the 14th Dalai Lama.
“(6) Since 2011, the 14th Dalai Lama has reiterated publicly on numerous occasions that decisions on the successions, emanations, or reincarnations of the Dalai Lama belongs to the Tibetan Buddhist faith community alone.
“(7) On June 8, 2015, the United States House of Representatives unanimously approved House Resolution 337 which calls on the United States Government to ‘underscore that government interference in the Tibetan reincarnation process is a violation of the internationally recognized right to religious freedom … and to highlight the fact that other countries besides China have long Tibetan Buddhist traditions, and that matters related to reincarnations in Tibetan Buddhism are of keen interest to Tibetan Buddhist populations worldwide’.
“(8) On April 25, 2018, the United States Senate unanimously approved Senate Resolution 429 which ‘expresses its sense that the identification and installation of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders, including a future 15th Dalai Lama, is a matter that should be determined solely within the Tibetan Buddhist faith community, in accordance with the inalienable right to religious freedom’.
“(9) The Department of State’s Report on International Religious Freedom for 2018 reported on policies and efforts of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to exert control over the selection of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders, including reincarnate lamas, and stated that ‘[United States] officials underscored that decisions on the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama should be made solely by faith leaders.’.
“(b) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States that—“(1) decisions regarding the selection, education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders are exclusively spiritual matters that should be made by the appropriate religious authorities within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition and in the context of the will of practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism;
“(2) the wishes of the 14th Dalai Lama, including any written instructions, should play a key role in the selection, education, and veneration of a future 15th Dalai Lama; and
“(3) interference by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people.
“(c) Holding Chinese Officials Responsible for Religious Freedom Abuses Targeting Tibetan Buddhists.—It is the policy of the United States to take all appropriate measures to hold accountable senior officials of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party who directly interfere with the identification and installation of the future 15th Dalai Lama of Tibetan Buddhism, successor to the 14th Dalai Lama, including by—“(1) imposing sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act [subtitle F of title XII of div. A of Pub. L. 114–328] ([former] 22 U.S.C. 2656 note [now 22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.]); and
“(2) prohibiting admission to the United States under section 212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(G)).
“(d) Department of State Programming to Promote Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists.—Consistent with section 401 of the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281; 130 Stat. 1436), the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom should support efforts to protect and promote international religious freedom in China and for programs to protect Tibetan Buddhism in China and elsewhere.”
Pub. L. 107–228, div. A, title VI, subtitle B, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1396, as amended by Pub. L. 114–323, title VII, § 715(b)(1), Dec. 16, 2016, 130 Stat. 1946; Pub. L. 115–94, § 13, Dec. 18, 2017, 131 Stat. 2041; Pub. L. 116–260, div. FF, title III, § 341, Dec. 27, 2020, 134 Stat. 3119; Pub. L. 118–70, § 5, July 12, 2024, 138 Stat. 1489, provided that:
[For definitions of “Secretary” and “appropriate congressional committees” as used in subtitle B of title VI of div. A of Pub. L. 107–228, set out above, see section 3 of Pub. L. 107–228, set out as a note under section 2651 of this title.]
[Functions of President under section 613(b) of Pub. L. 107–228, set out above, delegated to Secretary of State by section 1 of Ex. Ord. No. 13313, July 31, 2003, 68 F.R. 46073, set out as a note under section 301 of Title 3, The President.]
Policy of the United States With Respect to MacauPub. L. 106–570, title II, Dec. 27, 2000, 114 Stat. 3040, provided that:
Executive Documents
Delegation of Certain Functions and Authorities Under the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 and Public Law 117–78
Memorandum of President of the United States, Dec. 7, 2023, 88 F.R. 87651, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of State[,] the Secretary of the Treasury[, and] the Secretary of Homeland Security
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby order as follows:
Section 1. (a) I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the functions and authorities vested in the President by the following provisions of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145) (UHRPA) [section 6 set out as a note above] and Public Law 117–78 [set out as a note above]:
(i) section 6(a)(1) of the UHRPA, with respect to submitting the report;
(ii) section 6(e) of the UHRPA; and
(iii) section 5(c)(1) of Public Law 117–78, with respect to submitting the report.
(b) I hereby delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the functions and authorities vested in the President by the following provisions of the UHRPA and Public Law 117–78:
(i) section 6(a)(1) of the UHRPA, with respect to making the determinations;
(ii) section 6(g) of the UHRPA, with respect to terminating the sanctions described in section 6(c)(1) of the UHRPA and imposed under section 6(b) of the UHRPA; and
(iii) section 5(c)(1) of Public Law 117–78, with respect to making the determinations.
(c) I hereby delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury the functions and authorities vested in the President by the following provisions of the UHRPA and Public Law 117–78:
(i) section 6(b) of the UHRPA, with respect to imposing the sanctions described in section 6(c)(1) of the UHRPA;
(ii) section 6(c)(1) of the UHRPA;
(iii) section 6(d) of the UHRPA; and
(iv) section 5(c)(2) of Public Law 117–78, with respect to imposing the sanctions described in section 6(c)(1) of the UHRPA.
(d) I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the functions and authorities vested in the President by the following provisions of the UHRPA and Public Law 117–78:
(i) section 6(b) of the UHRPA, with respect to imposing the sanctions described in section 6(c)(2) of the UHRPA;
(ii) section 6(g) of the UHRPA, with respect to terminating the sanctions described in section 6(c)(2) of the UHRPA and imposed under section 6(b) of the UHRPA; and
(iii) section 5(c)(2) of Public Law 117–78, with respect to imposing the sanctions described in section 6(c)(2) of the UHRPA.
Sec. 2. The delegations in this memorandum shall apply to any provisions of any future public laws that are the same or substantially the same as those provisions referenced in this memorandum.
Sec. 3. The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
J.R. Biden, Jr.